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The purpose of this essay is to review existing research on legislative-
administrative bureaucratic and legislative-interest group relations from the 
1970's until the late 1990's in Korea. From a critical viewpoint, the extant 
literature on the relationship between legislators and bureaucrats or interest 
groups in Korea is meager, shallow, and outdated. Korean legislative politics is 
in the process of transition. Although the inertia of old political practices may be 
still strong, there also exist increasingly significant undercurrents militating 
against it. The future direction is toward a stronger legislature in a more 
competitive regime. The current research practices, however, are not likely to 
measure up to these possible changes. The existing research lacks the 
diversity in theoretical perspectives and investigative strategies. The tradition of 
descriptive-therapeutic studies with rudimentary empirical evidence is deep 
rooted. There exist only some systematically executed behavioral-empirical 
studies. In addition, the studies drawing on formal deductive theories are a rare 
breed. It is imperative that old research practices should be overhauled with the 
introduction of altemative theoretical perspectives and research strategies. The 
research needs reorientation and innovation. At this juncture, the field of Korean 
legislative studies probably stands in need of a Fenno who serves as a bridge 
connecting detailed descriptive studies to those based on deductive theoretical 
perspectives. 
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I. Introduction 
Since the democratization of the regime in the 1980's, the study of the National 
Assembly has gained wide recognition as an important enterprise among the researchers 
on Korean politics. In the most part of the pre-democratic authoritarian era, the national 
legislature remained a symbol of representative democracy with little substantive power. 
Hence it used to be given a low priority on the agenda for empirical political research. 
As a result, anecdotal and journalistic accounts abound, but there exists scant amount of 
serious scholarly research on Korean legislative politics. Moreover, very few scholars 
have published their works in English so that they can be readily available for the world-
wide readership. I) It is an appropriate time to expose the case of Korean national 
legislature to comparative legislative research, including that on the U. S. Congress, and 
to help students of Korean legislative politics catch up with the current state of 
comparative legislative research. 
The purpose of this essay is to take stock of and review existing research on the 
relationship between the legislature and two elements of its environment, administrative 
agencies and interest groups, in Korea. Due to the lamentable lack of literature on 
legislative-administrative bureaucratic and legislative-interest group relations, I draw on 
even partially or marginally relevant works, and make an endeavor to put these pieces 
together into a well-focused review. 
This essay consists of four parts. First, I discuss briefly the policy-making power of 
the Korean national legislature from comparative perspectives, relative to other national 
legislatures and in terms of the recent regime change. This discussion sets the context 
for this essay, and spurs us to think how the study of the Korean case can enrich the field 
of comparative legislative research. Second, I attempt to provide a glimpse of the facets 
of interaction between legislators and bureaucrats by looking closely at the ways in 
1) One notable exception may be Professor Chong Lim Kim at the University of Iowa together with his 
numerous publications. 
Legislators, Bureaucrats, and Interest Groups in Korea: A Review Essay 165 
which the legislature oversees, supervises, and controls administrative agencies, Third, I 
present the current status of our understanding about the nature and extent of interest 
group influence on the Korean legislature, Finally, given the overview and appraisal of 
existing studies, I suggest what kinds of research tasks lie ahead of students of Korean 
legislative politics, and stress the needs for generating research outputs comparable in 
quality to those produced by leading scholars engaged in comparative legislative 
research, 
II. Policy-Making Power of the Korean National Assembly 
The Korean National Assembly began its institutional life in 1948, and has a turbulent 
history. The legislature underwent three dissolutions and two more curtailments of its 
terms amid the whirlwind of regime changes. The recent significant change in the 
political regime is the transition in the late 1980's from the previous authoritarianism to 
the current Six Republic's democracy. Under a presidential system, the legislature is 
given constitutional means of checking the executive. As an institution linking the 
people with the government, the National Assembly is expected to serve as the agent of 
democratic consolidation. When it comes to the realities of legislative politics, however, 
tenacious old practices die hard. Conflict between parties within the legislature is not 
managed in an orderly manner. The legislature has yet to establish itself as an effective 
player of its proper roles. Overall, it remains uninstitutionalized (c. W Park 1997; and 
his 1999). 
In the authoritarian era, the National Assembly could not exercise a policy influence 
independent of the executive. It used to be called a handmaiden of the executive. Still, 
even in the democratic era, it is never a legislature whose policy influence is strong. This 
situation stimulates the lively discussion on the legislative reform for enhancing the 
legislature as a policy actor (H. Ahn 1978; C. L. Kim and Pai 1981; Y O. Yoon 1986; C. 
L. Kim 1988; Bark 1989; and Paik 1995). 
Existing studies on lawmaking in the National Assembly have drawn on several 
measures, such as the volume and success rate of "member bills" versus "government 
bills," the extent of the legislature'S modifying bills, the amount of time alloted for 
deliberating bills, its capacity to reject the passage of bills preferred by the president, the 
incidence of legislative-executive conflict shown by the presidential use of his veto 
power, and so on.2) In general, government bills tend to outnumber member bills, and 
the former are more frequently adopted than the latter. Bills are perfunctorily 
deliberated. The legislature hardly fails to approve the bills of presidential preference. 
These patterns of lawmaking were highly visible in the authoritarian era, and remain 
intact to a great extent in the first decade of democratic era except for the first half 
(1988-1989) of the Thirteenth Assembly. In the first two years of the Thirteenth 
Assembly, the president's party was in the position of legislative minority and often 
overwhelmed by the legislative initiative taken by opposition legislators (M. Shin 1985; 
his 1996; Chung 1988: Y. O. Yoon 1986; and C. W. Park 1999).3) 
A look at the budget deliberation in a legislature can show the extent of its policy 
influence. The extent of final modifications made by the National Assembly in the 
original executive proposal may be a good indicator of its leverage over fiscal matters. 
Usually, changes come within just one percent of the original proposal. The legislature'S 
budgetary power is limited in many important ways. The budget and account committee 
is a temporary special committee which changes membership every year and so does 
not deal with fiscal matters on a continuous basis. The amount of time for budget review 
is insufficient and hardly conducive to a thorough examination (Y. Kim 1989; Y. Oh 
1989; S. Kang 1992a; his 1992b; and Park 1999). 
2) A member bill refers to the one introduced by legislators, while a government bill, by the executive 
branch. In Korean politics, the tenn "government" is, more often than not, used in a narrow sense, 
meaning the executive branch which includes the president, state council (cabinet) and 
administrative agencies. 
3) In the middle of the 15th Assembly (1996-2000), a new period of "divided government" in the 
American parlance began with the inauguration of a new president, a fonner opposition leader. Yet 
we cannot definitely say that the National Assembly then began to exercise its increased policy 
leverage. 
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In order to bring the policy-making power of the Korean National Assembly into 
comparative perspective, and also to trace temporal changes in its policy-making power, 
an appropriate measure or a classificatory scheme is needed. In classifying legislatures, 
Mezey has offered a trichotomous scale of policy-making power: strong, modest, and 
little or none. On this judgmental scale, over two thirds of the legislatures under his 
study fall into the middle category. Due to little variation on it, the scale cannot 
discriminate the Korean National Assembly against the British Parliament in the policy-
making power. When applying the measure to a legislature across time, it is not likely to 
show significant variation, either (Mezey 1979, 36). So I would suggest a four-point 
ordinal scale for assessing a legislature's overall policy influence as follows: 
A very strong policy influence: this coincides with Mezey's category of a strong policy-
making power. The legislature in this category takes the policy initiative. In policy 
deliberation, it makes a significant modification of executive proposal, willingly rejects it, and 
can even substitute its own. It is a central, assertive, independent, and highly autonomous 
policy actor, participating as a co-partner of the executive in policy process. 
A somewhat strong policy influence: this describes a legislature which belongs to the upper 
echelon within the Mezey's "modest" category. This legislature has a passive, inconspicuous, 
responding stance relative to the executive in policy initiative. But it closely deliberates 
policies brought forward by the executive: making significant modifications of executive 
proposals, though neither frequently rejecting them nor demonstrating much will to substitute 
policy of its own. In the process of deliberation, this legislature represents diverse opinions 
and interests, hence making public policy responsive to popular demands. It may be 
subordinate to the executive in the sense that it plays a secondary policy-making role often 
overshadowed by the executive. But it is not simply subservient but shows its considerable 
institutional and functional autonomy. It can set the parameters within which the executive 
operates. 
A somewhat weak policy influence: this description is appropriate to a legislature 
belonging to the lower echelon within the Mezey's "modest" category. This legislature takes 
little policy initiative. Its policy deliberation, on the whole, remains of a perfunctory, 
superlicial and limited nature. Modifications of executive proposals are made clearly within 
the bounds of the executive's preferences. It seldom rejects executive proposals, and lacks the 
will to substitute its own. The legislature is virtually a subservient rubber stamp, and hardly 
said to be autonomous. 
A vety weak policy influence: this is the same as what Mezey calls little or no policy-
making power. A legislature falling into this category carries no notion of policy initiative. 
Only nominal deliberation exists. It is not at all expected to reject executive proposals nor to 
modify them even marginally. Its utmost important policy role is to legitimate executive 
proposals. This legislature is outrightly subservient, and has lost its autonomy. 
Now one can apply the above four-fold measure of a legislature's policy influence to 
the Korean National Assembly. The Ninth through Eleventh Assemblies at the most 
repressive phase of the authoritarian era were very weak legislatures in terms of their 
policy-making power. The Twelfth Assembly during the late phase of authoritarianism 
was a somewhat weak one. In the democratic era, the Thirteenth Assembly during its 
fIrst two years was possibly a somewhat strong legislature. However, this Assembly 
later turned into a somewhat weak legislature. Since then the national legislature has 
remained somewhat weak. In the beginning of the democratic era, the legislature's 
policy influence increased remarkably. But soon the legislature has become relegated to 
a weak body again. Change is short, but continuity is long for Korean legislative 
politics. 
III. Legislative Oversight and Control of the Bureaucracy 
Researchers have seen legislative-executive relations mostly as the conflict or 
cooperation between the national legislature and the president. The constitution provides 
a presidential system based on the principles of separation of powers and also checks 
and balances. Unlike the United States prototype, however, Korean presidentialism has 
made the power balance tipped toward the president. This is indicated by the president's 
emergency powers and significant constraints on the legislative branch in its 
organization and operation. Not only the constitution but also political practices have led 
researchers to put much emphasis on the legislature's dependence or executive 
dominance (H. Ahn 1978; C. L. Kim and Pai 1981; and Bark 1989). 
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Only a small number of researchers examined legislative-executive relations at the 
level of interaction between the legislature and administrative bureaucracy. Given that in 
Korea executive decision-making power is concentrated in the president, his close aides 
and cabinet ministers, and that the bureaucracy is characterized by a high level of 
political dependence on the president (Cho 1984,283; Paek 1982,478-80), the lack of 
scholarly concern about legislative-administrative bureaucratic relations may be 
understandable. But our knowledge of policy process remains incomplete without 
studying those relations where much of concrete policy action takes place. 
In this section, this review discusses Korean legislative-administrative bureaucratic 
relations by focusing on how the National Assembly oversees and controls the 
bureaucracy. Legislative oversight, supervision, and control constitute a central aspect of 
interaction between legislators and bureaucrats in policy process (Loewenberg and 
Patterson 1979,269-79). While overseeing the content of implemented policies, and the 
personnel and budgetary resources involved in policy implementation, the legislature 
obtains information on the operation of administrative agencies, and holds bureaucrats 
accountable for their policy actions. 
1. Annual Inspection of Administrative Agencies 
Major means of legislative oversight and control, provided by the constitution, 
include annual inspection, specially arranged investigation, and interpellation for 
questioning ministers orally or in writing. Journalists, legislative staff, pundits and 
scholars have offered accounts of the legislature's inspection, investigation, and 
interpellation activities. Some of these accounts describe the oversight procedures the 
legislature goes through, and the legal backgrounds relevant to oversight activities. 
Others state problems with current practices of legislative oversight and control, and go 
further to offer prescriptions for solving the problems. Only a few researchers have 
attempted to provide some sort of empirical studies on how the legislature deals with 
administrative agencies, mainly during the periods of annual inspection (M. Oh 1990; 
H. K. Kim 1996; and J. Park and Lim 1996). Though these studies may not be driven by 
systematic theories nor based on explicit hypotheses, they can serve as a foundation for 
further empirical research. They are reviewed here. 
The annual inspection of administrative agencies by the National Assembly is a rarely 
found legislative procedure all over the world. At the outset of the annual regular 
session, the legislature establishes a period of twenty days or less for conducting this 
inspection. Each standing committee oversees administrative agencies under its 
jurisdiction. Inspection is conducted in committee rooms or on the spot, i.e., at agencies 
or other places visited by legislators. The legislature once lost the right of inspection 
during the height of authoritarianism, but has regained it in the democratic era. Owing to 
such means, the legislature strives to check the executive. Still, as this review indicates 
below, oversight produces a modest effect. This also tells that the national legislature 
remains a somewhat weak policy-making body.4) 
2. The Nature of Legislative Inspection 
Kim in his study of legislative inspection in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Assemblies 
defines two types of legislative inspection. One is "policy-oriented" inspection 
(cheongchaek gamsa), whereas the other is "politics-dominated" inspection (cheongchi 
gamsa.). The former focuses on the analysis and evaluation of policies, aiming at 
identifying and solving policy problems. In this type of inspection, legislators draw on 
obtained documents and their expertise, and apply objective standards, such as 
efficiency and instrumental rationality. On the other hand, the latter is concerned with 
who is right or wrong concerning political issues, leading to the exposure of 
irregularities and accountability problems. In such inspection, legislators are highly 
sensitive to public opinion. They apply "the logic of politics" and seek partisan interests. 
4) In the Korean National Assembly, legislative sessions are not convened in a year-round format. The 
legislature meets either in the regular or special session. The regular session opens annually on 
September 1 (earlier, September 10) or the next day if the day is a holiday. The duration of this 
session may not exceed one hundred days. A special session may be convened at the request of the 
president or at least one fourth of the total membership. Its duration is limited up to thirty days. 
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At the early phase of the democratic era in the late 1980's and early 1990's, annual 
inspections were to a large extent politics-dominated, But later inspections have become 
highly policy-oriented (H, K Kim 1996,27-30). 
Kim's study suggests that the shift in the nature of legislative inspection has been 
brought about by the progress in the regime's democratization. Postulating the policy-
oriented type as being ideal, the author judges that legislative inspection has changed in 
a desirable direction. Park and Lim (1996, 85), however, does not agree with this view. 
They argue that so-called politics-dominated inspection is an inevitable and normal face 
of legislative inspection, as long as the inspection is performed by politicians who seek 
pUblicity and responsiveness to popular sentiment. 
Park and Lim's research illuminates the legislator's electoral and partisan motivation 
for his or her inspection activity. On the premise that media coverage can mirror 
individual legislators' enthusiasm about and also actual performance of inspection 
activities, they have conducted content analysis of the articles on legislative inspection 
included in major national daily papers during the regular session of 1995. The 
frequency in which a legislator is cited by the name is used as a measure for the level of 
his or her inspection activity. The analysis has shown that junior legislators, greatly 
mindful of their electoral insecurity, received much more frequent media attention than 
did their senior colleagues. Also, opposition legislators got much more coverage than 
did the legislators of the president's party(77-84). The measure of inspection activity is 
somewhat crude, but this study shows the electoral and partisan bases of legislative 
oversight and control. 
3. The Level of Legislative Inspection and Its Problems 
How much inspection is there in the Korean National Assembly? Does the aggregate 
level of inspection vary from one year to another? Obviously, these questions are 
difficult to answer, because the researcher cannot easily come up with a valid indicator 
measuring the level of oversight performance by a legislature. Kim sets the regular 
session as the unit of analysis, and attempts to measure the level of inspection 
performance in a regular session. Two measures have been devised: the average amount 
of time spent for inspection per administrative agency, and the average number of cases 
per agency in which the legislature demanded the agency to correct past policy action or 
take a new appropriate measure. In Kim's study, these two measures are strongly 
correlated (H. K. Kim 1996, 45-7). 
All of the studies on legislative inspection, under review here, are considerably 
devoted to the diagnosis of and prescription for problems endemic to annual inspection 
in the Korean legislature. Some typical problems, arising from legislators' incapacity to 
organize and operate inspection, are as follows: 
Too many agencies are chosen by the committees for inspection every year. Some agencies 
are subject to inspection by multiple committees in the same year. Others are only 
superficially inspected. Still others undergo no inspection even after they have been selected 
for the inspection purpose. 
Legislators demand agencies to submit irrelevant documents in unreasonably large 
quantities. For information indispensable to inspection, they rely more on administrative 
agencies than on their personal staff or other legislative support personnel. Administrative 
agencies and bureaucrats are reluctant to disclose their information to the public. Information 
asymmetry is serious between legislators and bureaucrats. 
Too many witnesses are summoned. Legislators do not call witnesses selectively to take 
evidence, but blindly choose blocks of bureaucrats, including agency heads. Most witnesses 
are questioned perfunctorily. There are several cases in which some witnesses' testimonies are 
canceled after they have been chosen. 
During the inspection. legislators behave inappropriately. They question in an authoritarian 
manner. Their questions are wide off the mark, and reveal the lack of expertise. They raise 
questions without basic research and on rumors' grounds. They seek their own visibility 
excessively. and also put too much emphasis on their own partisan or district interests. They 
are obsessed with exposing irregularities. They fail to check up bureaucrats' follow-up action 
to correct problems revealed in past inspections. 
The existing studies also point out that there are problems with bureaucrats' behavior 
patterns. too. The bureaucrats under inspection are said to be lukewarm, passive, 
uncooperative, and sluggish in responding to legislators' request for information and 
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documentation, and answering the inspectors' queries. Administrative agencies do not 
expeditiously respond to legislators' demand for rectifying past mistakes and taking 
further appropriate measures. 
Researchers and close observers of legislative inspection end up with a long list of 
shortcomings and inadequacies concerning the current practices. But their identification 
of problems is not preceded by systematic inquiries about the causes and conditions of 
such "undesirable" behavior patterns found among legislators and bureaucrats. As a 
result, the logical connection is tenuous between the diagnosed problems and the 
prescribed treatments thereof. Normative imperatives often lead researchers to hasty 
prescriptions even though they know very little about why legislators and bureaucrats do 
behave this or that way. 
4. Legislators and Bureaucrats in Legislative Inspection: Adversarial? 
In which way do we characterize the relationship between the legislator as the 
inspector and the bureaucrat as the inspected? Is the pattern of their interaction during 
the inspection harmonious or adversarial? How are they similar or different in what they 
think about policy making and implementation? 
So far these important questions have not been seriously dealt with by any researcher. 
One study deserves mention. It administered a questionnaire survey to legislators and 
bureaucrats as well regarding some aspects of legislative inspection. According to the 
survey results, there exists a wide gap between the two groups in their attitudes toward 
the inspection. Legislators regard the national legislature as the most important 
institution for having administrative agencies rectify their mishandlings of public affairs, 
while bureaucrats see self-inspection mechanism within the executive branch as more 
important than the legislature for the same purpose. Bureaucrats evaluate much less 
favorably than legislators themselves do about the level of legislators' special expertise 
in performing inspection. A majority of bureaucrats complain about legislators' 
excessive request for documentation and also about their domineering posture. On the 
other hand, legislators tend to think of bureaucrats as unresponsive to their demands 
during and in the wake oflegislative inspection (M. Oh 1990). 
This survey research hints that there possibly exist disharmony and tension due to 
incompatible objectives and interests between legislators and bureaucrats. 
Unfortunately, the study was not extensive enough to delve systematically into the 
motivations and orientations of those actors involved in legislative inspection. The study 
should have further illuminated differing views and values about policy making and 
implementation between two groups of officials. For example, one may study 
empirically the difference in the relative importance of policy's technical efficacy and its 
political sensitivity between legislators and bureaucrats. Also, such study can be 
supplemented by systematic analysis of cases gleaned during the inspection period. 
5. Legislators and Bureaucrats in Resource Allocation: Collaborative? 
The budget review is conducted as a parliamentary procedure independent of 
legislative inspection. It performs a policy-formulating function and also engages the 
legislature in supervising and controlling administrative agencies. The finance and 
economy board (later, the planning and budget ministry) draws up an overall budget 
proposal. Once the proposal is submitted by the executive to the national legislature, it is 
fust reviewed by each standing committee which deals with the portion of the budget 
concerning the administrative agencies under its jurisdiction. At the next stage, the 
special committee on budget and accounts embarks on an overall examination. 
Throughout the budget-making process, legislators and bureaucrats interact at three 
nodes. First, legislators of the president's party and bureaucrats in charge of preparing 
the budget proposal have a series of consultation behind the closed doors prior to its 
introduction to the legislature. Second, when the preliminary review is undertaken in 
each standing committee, committee members encounter their counterpart bureaucrats. 
Third, at the overall review stage, the members of the budget and accounts committee 
query the minister of finance and economy together with bureaucrats in his ministry. For 
researchers, all this suggest that there are multiple points of observing the interaction 
between legislators and bureaucrats in the budget-making process. 
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Kang has produced interesting research results on the interaction between legislators 
and bureaucrats during the budget deliberation in standing committees (Kang 1992a; his 
1992b). He provides qualitative descriptive analysis of four committees' proceedings on 
the preliminary review in the Thirteenth Assembly. Bureaucrats strive to expand their 
budget or to have it not reduced by defending the significance, validity and feasibility of 
their programs and projects. The picture of the bureaucrat as a budget maximizer is 
clearly drawn. Legislators act as advocates for the programs to be implemented by their 
jurisdictional agencies, rather than as guardians of public funds. Legislators are 
sympathetic with and even overtly supportive of the bureaucrats whom they are 
supposed to oversee. Legislators increase the level of spending for the agencies. This 
pattern is salient especially in the standing committees dealing with a lot of public works 
projects. This may suggest the existence of policy subsystem in the area of distributive 
policies, though it has been thus far seriously examined in no research. 
One can reasonably surmise that legislators and bureaucrats cooperate much more 
often than conflict during the consultation between the ruling party and the executive 
branch prior to the introduction of a budget proposal, and also during the overall review 
in the budget and accounts committee. For example, at the comprehensive review stage, 
in line with what the bureaucrats in the economy and finance board desire, members of 
the budget and account committee cut the spending levels proposed by the standing 
committees. When it comes to resource allocation, one can observe a different image of 
interaction between legislators and bureaucrats: legislative committees and 
administrative agencies are more likely through common objectives and interests to 
build collaborative relationships than to generate disharmony and conflict. 
In addition, it should be noted that Korean legislators frequently seek favor from 
bureaucrats outside of the deliberation process. Legislators intercede with the 
bureaucracy by paying personal visits or making phone calls in order to provide 
particularized services to individual constituents or influence the specific allocation of 
scarce governmental resources for the benefit of their districts (c. L. Kim and Pai 1981, 
186-217; Kim, Barkan, Turan and Jewell 1984, 128; C. W. Park 1988a and 1988b). In a 
polity where the legislature has a weak policy-making power, the central scene of pork 
barrel politics lies in the bureaucracy. Personal relationships forged typically through 
school ties or common birthplaces are a decisive factor that renders some legislators 
more effective than others in advocating the needs of their districts before the 
bureaucrats in charge. 
6, The Impact of Legislative Oversight on Administrative Behavior 
Legislative inspection is a "police-patrol" oversight method in that it is a direct, 
regular and planned surveillance of administrative behavior. This type of oversight is 
time-consuming and costly for the legislature (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Given 
the resources invested, to what extent is the oversight effective? In Korea, are 
administrative agencies responsive to the legislature? Are bureaucrats effectively curbed 
by legislators? In light of democratic principles and practices as well, these are 
important questions. 
A host of problems with legislative inspection, listed earlier from the extant research, 
suggest that legislators are deficient in their competence and information for performing 
substantive oversight of the bureaucracy. The standard view refutes legislative 
dominance but indicates bureaucratic dominance: administrative agencies are not 
responsive to the national legislature. Bureaucrats seem to be responsive only to the 
president, given the president's strong and highly centralized decision-making power. 
This standard view is plausible and persuasive in Korean legislative politics, but has not 
been seriously tested yet. Empirical questions about the impact of legislative oversight 
on bureaucratic responsiveness need to be raised and thoroughly examined. 
Kim's study suggests that administrative agencies do not promptly respond to the 
request of the National Assembly for correcting their malfeasance and inaction pointed 
out during the inspection. The study, using the annual regular session as the unit of 
analysis, counted the number of days elapsed from the date of the legislature's post-
inspection request for the executive branch's necessary action until the date of the 
latter's report on the requested action (H. K. Kim 1996, 42-3). In the gross, this may 
indicate the celerity of bureaucratic responsiveness. This measure varies from one 
Legislators, Bureaucrats, and Interest Groups in Korea: A Review Essay 177 
regular session to another. Still, it leaves much to be desired as a good measure of the 
effectiveness of legislative oversight. 
To figure out the impact of legislative oversight on administrative behavior in a 
systematic fashion, one needs to observe the interaction between standing committees 
and the agencies under their respective jurisdiction over a reasonably long span of time. 
By doing so, the researcher can empirically determine the extent of bureaucratic 
slippage or drift in various policy areas, that is, how much the administrative agencies 
depart from the legislature's preferences in policy implementation. 
IV. Legislators and Interest Groups 
In this section, I review existing literature on interest group politics, with a special 
focus on legislative decision making, in Korea. Because virtually no scholarly piece has 
focused exclusively on the interaction between legislators and interest groups, this essay 
begins with an overview of leading works which treat interest group politics in a general 
manner. Then, I gradually zero in on the legislative-interest group relations. 
By interest groups, I refer mainly to "associational interest groups", that is, organized 
specialized groups whose major function is to articulate their interests (Almond and 
Powell 1966, 78). Legislators represent two main types of constituents: interest groups 
and unorganized district voters. While the former has drawn little attention from 
students of Korean legislative politics, the latter has attracted considerable scholarly 
attention. The obvious reason is that, given executive dominance in the making of public 
policies, legislators are more likely to make great endeavors to meet district voters' 
particularized nonpolicy demands than to meet generalized policy demands from 
organized interests (c. L. Kim and Pai 1981, 188-2l7; C. W. Park 1988a and 1988b). 
But pluralistic competition activated by the regime's democratization leads researchers 
to sense an increasingly important role of interest groups in the political arena. 
1. Perspectives on Interest Group Politics: Pluralist versus Corporatist 
In describing and explaining interest group politics, pluralism and corporatism are 
two major theoretical perspectives. Pioneering works on Korean interest group politics 
in the authoritarian era, which relied on structural functional analysis, systems analysis 
or the group approach, were couched in the pluralist perspective (H. Ahn 1971; B. Y 
Abn 1973; H. Yoon 1975; Yu 1976177). They assumed a political market in which 
groups competed with each other in an attempt to put pressure on political elites to make 
decisions in their favor. In analyzing Korean interest group politics, however, they did 
not adopt a pure type of pluralism. Precisely speaking, they applied the perspective of 
limited pluralism (Y. H. Kim 1995). They accepted that groups' autonomy was to a 
significant extent constrained by the government, and the political market being far short 
of full competition and biased in favor of groups with plentiful economic resources, 
typically business interest. 
This pluralist perspective fell under criticism by the researchers who adopted the state 
corporatist perspective as defined by Schmitter( 1979). The alternative perspective saw 
Korean interest group politics in the authoritarian era as based on hierarchically 
organized, non-competing, officially sanctioned, state-imposed and state-sponsored 
groups. According to the researchers of this perspective, not the competition among 
groups seeking their own benefit but the state's control of organized interests was the 
most fundamental characteristic of the authoritarian regime pursuing industrialization 
policy (Y R. Kim 1990; Choi 1984; Chang 1985, 132; M. K. Park 1987; and Chang 
1996, 293). Instead of inter- or intra-group dynamics for interest articulation, the 
dependent relationship of organized interests on the state was the key focus of analysis 
based on this alternative perspective. The state-labor and the state-capital relations were 
given inordinate amount of scholarly attention. This perspective became dominant 
among Korean political analysts, especially among young scholars who found the 
radical political economy paradigm, such as O'Donnell's theory of bureaucratic 
authoritarianism derived from Latin American political experiences (1973), relevant to 
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the study of Korean politics. 
With democratization in the 1980's, interest group politics has undergone dramatic 
changes. The remarkable increase in the number of interest groups indicates the 
advocacy explosion. In particular, the number of labor organizations and the rate of 
unionization have shot up. A dramatic change is also felt in quality terms. Organized 
labor's stronghold has shifted from the manufacturing manpower to white-collar 
workers. Dissident organizations, which operated underground earlier, have been 
revitalized and gained de facto recognition. Public interest groups, organizing 
environmentalists, consumers, feminists and advocates of socioeconomic reform have 
burgeoned. The government itself has adopted more flexible and permissive policies 
toward interest groups than before (c. Lee 1990; Y. R. Kim 1992; S. Lee 1993/94; Y. R. 
Kim 1996; S. Kim 1996). Against this backdrop, pluralism gradually regains its strength 
as a theoretical perspective on interest group politics. Even the previous admirer of the 
state corporatist perspective recognizes the relevance of the pluralist perspective to the 
study of recent interest group politics (Y. R. Kim 1994, 7-14). Still, only a few 
researchers have attempted to apply analytic concepts and research strategies suggested 
by the pluralist perspective (c. Lee 1990). 
As stated above, the state corporatist perspective emphasizes the flow of coercive 
influence from the state to organized interests. This is why the perspective is seen as 
valid in the case of authoritarianism. But, in the democratic era, the pluralist perspective, 
aptly taking into account organized interests' influence on the government, becomes 
plausible. 
Some disciples of corporatism argue that "a pluralist perspective sees political trees 
only, whereas a corporatist perspective easily beholds the forest" (Y. R. Kim 1994,4). 
Their primary theoretical units of analysis are the state, the class or other abstract 
collectivity. The discourse dwells on the forest level. In their research, however, 
observational strategy is not much different from the research based on a pluralist 
perspective. Actions taken by a set of administrative agencies and specific interest 
groups, which are all political trees in the metaphor, are observed. Inferring from this 
observation up to the abstract collectivity level makes researchers highly vulnerable to 
the fallacy of composition. 
A corporatist perspective may render a theoretical lens through which the researcher 
conceives the state as an organic whole and draws a macro picture about its relations 
with organized interests. But this makes the researcher blind to the relative weight of 
each constituent element of the state and to the interactions among the elements in 
policy process. In the contemporary world, the executive action is readily considered as 
the state action. In so doing, the role of the legislative branch is overshadowed and 
ignored. The state can be a unitary actor at some time. But at other times the conflict and 
cooperation among the legislative, executive and judiciary branches are too important to 
disregard. A corporatist perspective tends to underestimate the legislature's policy 
influence much more than dictated by the realities even in the authoritarian regime. 
Whether it is state corporatism or societal corporatism, a corporatist perspective sees 
interest group politics as operating largely outside the legislative framework. 
In fact, as far as legislative-interest group relations are concerned, the research based 
on the state corporatist perspective has newly added no significant knowledge to what 
the perspective of limited pluralism had produced. These studies simply reinforced the 
following propositions already pointed out throughout the earlier works: 
In the authoritarian era, Korean interest groups lacked functional autonomy and were 
amenable to government control (B. Y. Ahn 1983,75). 
In the authoritarian era, business groups had easier access to and stronger influence on the 
government than did labor or farming groups (H. Abn 1971, 105; B. Y. Ahn 1983,77). 
In the authoritarian era, the major target which interest groups desire to get access to and 
influence was the executive branch (H. Yoon 1975; B. Y. Abn 1983,81). 
2. Government Control over Labor 
The Korean Federation of Trade Unions (KFTU) has officially represented the 
country's labor force for long. This peak organization retains a massive size of 
membership, but depends on state subsidy for its operation. In the authoritarian era, this 
organization was tightly controlled by repressive labor laws and other legal frameworks, 
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including the national security law. Several researchers scrutinized the state-labor 
relations largely from the state corporatist perspective (Choi 1984; Y R. Kim 1990). 
Choi defines the state control over labor in the 1970's as an exclusionary type of state 
corporatism. In his terms, the state control is characterized by the "political 
demobilization" of labor through "a coercive control system," a conflictual relationship 
of strong state versus weak labor (1984, 53). Labor representatives were formally 
included as participants in various advisory or consultative commissions within the 
executive branch. In such ways, organized labor secured institutionalized access to key 
decision makers, including the president. But the access was made possible mainly as a 
device for the executive's gaining public acceptance of labor policies. In reality, 
workers' rights and union autonomy were drastically curtailed (Choi 1984,46-7; Y R. 
Kim 1990, 224-42). Therefore, workers at grassroots became discontented and 
occasionally involved in protest actions. 
With the regime going through democratic transition, workers aggressively 
articulated their demands for better wages and working conditions, and for the right to 
set up another central organization which can serve as an alternative to the pro-
government KFTU. Eventually, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) 
could be launched and now exists in rivalry with the KFTU (1m 1992). This situation 
clearly put an end to the state corporatist control over labor. 
To resolve labor strife peacefully, recent democratic governments have continued to 
seek compromise through a tripartite mechanism, in which the government or public 
interest, labor and business are included. But Korea lacks important conditions for this 
western European or societal corporatist strategy to work effectively. First, both labor 
and business peak associations are not capable of making their member unions or firms 
follow central directives compulsorily. Second, up to the late 1990's, labor has not 
maintained a close link with any significant political party. Trade unions are not fully 
given the right to engage in political activities, including political donation, campaigning 
or alliance making with political parties (1m 1992; K. Shin 1997, 198-9). Prospects for 
the expansion of workers' political rights notwithstanding, conventional channels for 
making their voice are still unattractive to them. At times, this leads them to resort to 
excessive pressure tactics, such as fervent protests and strikes. 
3. Government-Business Relations 
Business speaks to the government through such organizations as the Federation of 
Korean Industries (FKI), the Korea Chamber of Cornmerce and Industry, the Korea 
Traders' Association and so forth. Multiple business peak organizations exist not due to 
rivalry but largely to a division of labor among them. In fact, their leaders often overlap 
(B. Y. Ahn 1983, 79-80). Of these organizations, the FKI is run mainly by big business 
conglomerates, chaebeol, and is the most powerful (Chang 1996,294). Its membership 
size is relatively small, but membership fees alone make it financially independent. It is 
a cohesive organization and maintains specialized staff for conducting research and 
articulating its interests (Y. R. Kim 1990,100; 202-13). 
Several researchers approached the state-capital or government-business relations in 
the authoritarian era, from the state corporatist perspective. The government forced big 
business owners to organize the FKI. The organization was guided and directed by the 
government. Nonetheless, differently than with organized labor, the government 
maintained basically inclusionary and harmonious relationship with business groups (Y. 
R. Kim 1990,97; Chang 1996,295). 
The "developmental" executive-centered state with economic development as its 
primary policy objective induced big business to participate in the making of economic 
policy and worked closely with it (Johnson 1987; E. M. Kim 1997). Business 
organizations themselves were not allowed to involve in campaign activity or outrightly 
endorse specific candidates in elections. Still, businessmen as individuals could easily 
advance their political career. What is more important, big business served as the major 
pipeline for legally or illegally financing politicians, especially those of the ruling party. 
This gave birth to the long-lasting politics-business collusion as is discussed later. In 
brief, government-business relations used to be mutually supportive (Y. R. Kim 1990, 
224-42). 
Nowadays Korean big business has grown into the world-class one, and become 
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confident about their continuous expansion without government support. In the 
democratic era, the friction broke out between the national leadership and big business, 
as shown by the Hyundai corporation founder's run for the presidency in 1992 (Moon 
1994; E. M. Kim 1997). But, except for such sporadic incidences, the state remains pro-
capital and in symbiosis with big business. 
4. How Interest Groups Influence Policy Makers: Access Channels and Techniques 
There is a consistent body of research on how interest groups get to and influence 
policy-makers. Yoon made a contribution to the empirical analysis of the access 
channels and techniques for interest groups' lobbying public policy makers (H. Yoon 
1975). His typology has been continually adopted in the follow-up studies, and so the 
cross-sectional or longitudinal comparison is possible. 
Based on the initial typologies of Almond and Powell's (1966, 80-6), and Duverger's 
(1972, 121-5), Yoon has classified lobbying into two forms, "direct action toward the 
power elite, "and "indirect action at the mass level." The former uses the following 
access channels and techniques: elite representation (being recruited into the legislature 
or other government decision making bodies, testimony at the legislature, and face-to-
face interview or conference with policy makers), making recommendation or petition 
directly to them, providing them with research results or other information, helping them 
with electoral campaigns, inviting them to receptions and awarding them letters of 
recognition or gratitude. The latter aims at generating mass support for groups' own 
causes. The access channels and techniques included here are: nonviolent propaganda 
(public release of resolution, statement, research or inquiry results, and information for 
the purpose of various campaigns, and public relations), violence-prone or manifestly 
violent means (demonstrations, strikes, riots and the like). 
Yoon applied the above typology to the interest articulation efforts made by the pro-
government national teachers' association during the years of 1951 through 1965. He 
counted the frequency in which each access channel or technique was used by this peak 
organization for lobbying the relevant policy makers. He found that the teachers' group 
much more often resorted to the elite-directed form of lobbying than otherwise. 
According to his explanation, the reason for this pattern of access and influence was that 
leaders of the group perceived elite-directed lobbying as effective in authoritarian 
politics. Yoon and his associate performed the same kind of analysis concerning the 
access channels and techniques employed by the identical group in the years of 1978 
through 1988. They obtained almost the same results as in the previous study (H. Yoon 
and Y. R. Kim 1989). 
A group's relative emphasis on either form of lobbying will obviously reflect the 
prevailing perception among its leaders about the effectiveness of lobbying channels and 
techniques. Such perception is affected not only by political environmental factors but 
also by the group's resources. Over the three decades since 1961, both labor and 
business peak organizations, the KFfU and the FKI alike, had engaged more frequently 
in elite-directed lobbying than in indirect mass-based lobbying. Nonetheless, there 
existed a significant difference in the relative mix of two forms of lobbying between 
these two organizations. The KFfU, having a large size of membership as its plentiful 
group resource, used mass-based techniques from time to time. Its effectiveness was 
limited because the repressive regime did not allow the organization to mobilize a 
critical mass sufficient to exert pressure upon it, though. On the other hand, the FKI, a 
sort of elite club boasting of a good connection with policy makers, seldom employed 
such form of lobbying (H. Yoon and Y. R. Kim 1989; Y. R. Kim 1990,249-54). In the 
Korean society with highly personalistic culture, business interests have a tremendous 
advantage in communicating with policy makers, for the elites in the public and private 
sectors share regional, school, family, military, or other ties to a great extent (H. Ahn 
1971,106; Chang 1985, 143; Macdonald 1996,131). 
Another study, conducted by Lee, also replicated Yoon's research strategy to 
investigate any possible change in groups' access channels and techniques due to the 
regime'S democratization(B. Lee 1992, 196-7). He has shown that both the KFfU and 
the FKI become now increasingly balanced in applying two forms of lobbying. A 
dramatic change has come to the business group, which feels a sense of democracy and 
manages an increased frequency of information campaigns usually with the help of the 
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mass media. 
Democratization has brought about new lobbying channels and techniques which 
were unknown to Yoon at the time of his study. Litigation, the technique of bringing the 
case before the court, has been recently found feasible. To the existing menu of indirect 
mass-based lobbying, American style of grassroots lobbying has been added: mobilizing 
constituents for making phone calls or writing letters to their legislators. In addition, 
coalition lobbying, the technique of building a united front with other groups, has been 
tried. These changes are well illustrated in Lee's study of interest group politics which 
has unfolded in the case of family law revision at the end of 1989(C. Lee 1990). 
Women's rights groups unitedly and vehemently pursued to make the legislature revise 
the law in the direction of promoting gender equality by the use of grassroots lobbying. 
The groups finally won over Confucian scholars' groups which were opposed to the 
revision by employing similar kinds of lobbying techniques. 
Electoral techniques are now likely to be put to use more frequently than ever before, 
even though existing laws still constrain their full usage (C. Lee 1996). Interest groups, 
except for business firms, are legally prohibited from making political financial 
contributions. Under its name, any interest group is not allowed to do campaign work 
for or deliver votes to the party or candidate of its preference. Nevertheless, group 
members can do such things as individual citizens. As the democratic regime becomes 
consolidated, the legal restrictions on these electoral techniques will be lifted up. 
5. The Legislative Arena as an Access Point 
The previous studies on interest articulation in the authoritarian era did not fail to 
mention that the legislative branch had a marginal significance as a point of access or as 
a target for lobbying. In the regime where the norm of executive dominance was strong, 
interest groups strived to approach and influence the executive branch, including the 
president, the prime minister, cabinet ministers, and high-level bureaucrats. These 
leading officials performed a great role of responding to the pressure and information 
they received through formal and informal channels. It is a truism that legislative 
lobbying was insignificant in the non-democratic political environment. 
On legislators' side as well, it was suggested that they seldom came into contact with 
interest group representatives. In an interview survey of Korean legislators in the late 
1960's, only a tiny percent of the respondents said that they had taken any kind of action 
on behalf of interest groups. Also, very few respondents mentioned interest groups as a 
major source of information for their legislative work (Woo 1978,43; C. L. Kim and Pai 
1981, 155). Korean legislators interviewed in the early 1970's chose party or electoral 
district as the most important focus of representation. In this interview, none paid 
attention to interest groups as the most important focus (C. L. Kim Barkan, Turan and 
Jewell 1984, 84-5). In fact, it is not unusual in the legislatures with a modest policy-
making power that the link between legislators and interest groups appears to be almost 
entirely missing (Mezey 1979,202-3). 
In the democratic era, executive dominance in policy making continues. But this does 
not mean that legislative lobbying has gained no significance. As mentioned earlier, the 
National Assembly has much more strengthened constitutional powers than in the 
previous authoritarian regime. In the first half of the Thirteenth Assembly, it showed a 
positive sign of change toward an actually strong legislature, though the change did not 
keep up for long. As the regime moves along toward democratic consolidation, the 
legislature'S potential for becoming a major policy actor will be increasingly actualized. 
Considering for all this, legislative lobbying should not be discounted as insignificant in 
Korean politics and for the research on it as well. Regrettably, most of those who 
specialize in legislative studies seem to take it for granted that the legislative-interest 
group linkage is still missing even in the democratic era. A few studies mentioned below 
suggest that this assumption is wrong. 
A study of interest articulation made by economic interest groups, including the 
KFfU and the FKI, in the earlier years of the democratic era shows that for those groups 
the legislature has become a much less insignificant point of access than before (B. Lee 
1992, 191-5). Another study has analyzed the legislative process of a law requiring the 
government to pay compensations to public officials discharged forcedly by the military 
leadership in 1980(J. Kim 1989). Immediately after the regime went through democratic 
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transition, those former officials were organized. The group made a petition to the 
National Assembly for compensation. In response to it, the legislature ruled by a 
majority of opposition parties combined enacted such law. The bill passed by the 
legislature was initially vetoed by the president. But the legislature passed its modified 
version, and it was finally signed by the president. This indicates clearly that the 
legislative arena is important as an access point for interest groups in policy process. 
One recent study suggests that some legislative committees are generically more 
important to interest groups than other legislative committees (c. W. Park 1998b). In 
general, the committees in the National Assembly are party-dominated. Despite this 
overall feature, the nature of policy environment is not uniform to all committees. The 
policy environment of a committee refers to external forces which constrain and put 
pressures on committees (Fenno 1973). Some committees, such as the committee on 
agriculture, forest, and fisheries, and the committee on health and welfare, are relatively 
more influenced by or work more closely with interest groups than other committees. 
This study, though preliminary, urges researchers to seriously dig into legislative 
lobbying. 
Corrupt practices of legislative lobbying in the democratic era are discussed below. 
There are numerous articles on them covered by newspapers and magazines. 
Paradoxically, they are telling pieces of evidence that the legislature is in fact a major 
point of access through which organized interests seek to influence policy process. Not 
scholarly researchers but journalists alone, with their peculiar alacrity, keep abreast of 
changing interest group politics. Unfortunately, their sensational accounts paint too 
much a degraded image of legislative lobbying. Apart from these stories of degenerate 
lobbying, we know very little about the specific ways in which interest groups interact 
with their friend or foe legislators in the legislative process. 
6. "LobI' in Interest Group Politics 
Rush defines lobbying as "the practice of attempting to persuade those who hold 
political power to exercise that power in favor of one individual or group ... against 
others, or in favor of one policy or set of policies against others" (Rush 1998, 810). 
Then, lobbying is, by definition, an inherent part of democratic political process. 
However, as it was in the old days of American politics, lobbying suggests "at worst 
bribery and corruption, at best undue influence" in Korean politics, too (Rush 1998, 
810). Lobi in Korean has a origin in the English word of lobby or lobbying. Lobi is a 
corrupt and clandestine type of direct lobbying. Among the public, lobbying means 
nothing more than lobi, and its democratic essence is not readily accepted. In the 
authoritarian era, even legislators themselves did not recognize the significance of 
legislative lobbying. In the late 1960's, one survey of legislators found that an 
overwhelming majority of the respondents objected to the idea of enhancing interest 
group activity in the legislative process due to its detrimental effect on the pursuit of 
public interest (Woo 1978, 43). To legislators, lobbying was tantamount to interest 
groups' efforts at influence buying. 
In the current democratic era, strengthened constitutional powers of the national 
legislature have enabled legislators to exercise leverage over policies of enormous 
economic interests. Involving in such cases, legislators may risk being preyed upon by 
interested business fIrms or groups. During the period of the Thirteenth Assembly, 13 
legislators were arrested in a string of corruption charges. Some of them illegally 
obtained fInancial support from a business association for luxurious overseas travel. 
Others were bribed by a construction company for inducing administrative agencies to 
distribute newly developed housing tracts in southeastern Seoul for its benefIt (c. W. 
Park 1994, 184; N. Lee 1985). Of the standing committees in the legislature, the fInance 
committee is the most prominent target of lobi, because it has jurisdiction over public 
fInance and banking agencies dealing with such matters as corporate taxes and industrial 
loans (B. Park 1995, 182-3). Again, other economy-related committees, including those 
on construction, on commerce and industry, and on energy and national resources, are 
permeable to frequent lobi schemed by interest groups seeking a lucrative goal. It is 
known that some firms or groups run task forces for gathering information and, if 
deemed necessary, performing lobi, when the legislature is in session (Kwon 1991,267). 
A succession of lobi scandals have discouraged legislators to make contact even with 
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interest groups carrying out a lawful and legitimate type of lobbying, Well aware that 
this is not propitious to democratic political process, refonn-oriented intellectuals argue 
that a specific legal framework is needed for the disclosure or regulation of lobbying (l 
Kang and Kwon 1985, 674-8; Woo 1991, 6), It is desirable that Korean legislative 
scholars set out to systematically investigate the actual practices of lobbying and the 
relevant legal stipulations in other legislatures, such as the U. S, Congress, 
7, Policy Types and Interest Group Activity 
It is emphasized throughout this review that the nature and extent of interest group 
activity, especially lobbying, depend on regime type, authoritarian or democratic, This is 
an overarching organizing perspective in this essay. Importantly, however, the nature 
and extent of interest group lobbying depend on the type of public policy as well. The 
question is: In which types of policy are interest groups likely to attempt to influence 
policy makers, including legislators? 
On the basis of Lowi's typology of policy measures (Lowi 1964), Kim classified the 
cases of interest articulation made by two major economic interest groups in a 
conflictual position, the KFTU and the FKI, into distributive, regulatory and 
redistributive policy areas (Y. R. Kim 1990, 261). The interest articulation activities of 
these two peak organizations in the authoritarian era were concentrated in the area of 
redistributive policy matters. Expectedly, the two organizations were oftentimes 
antithetical in their policy positions. Another study by Lee (B. Lee 1992) had in mind 
the same question as Kim's. But the two studies used different research strategies, and 
their findings were incomparable. Lee focused on pieces of economic legislation passed 
by the legislature in the early years of the democratic era, and checked whether the 
KFTU or the FKI articulated their positions pro or con. The researcher classified 
economic legislation into four types according to what kind of function the state would 
perfonn by the specific measure: umpire, provider, regulator, and entrepreneur. This 
typology was incompatible with Lowi's. The study found that both organizations were 
likely to place the highest priority on regulatory economic measures for lobbying. Of the 
two, the FK1 representing big business, was more so. The KFTU's pattern of prioritizing 
in interest articulation was a less concentrated one. To a significant extent, it expressed 
supportive or opposing views on umpire measures, such as one for arbitrating labor-
management disputes, and also on provider measures intended to meet basic needs of 
living. 
Jung and others (1996) have done a widely replicable and dynamic analysis. This 
work examines the effect of a policy on the extent of interest groups' legislative 
lobbying and also on the pattern of legislators' response to the lobbying. Basically, they 
have applied the Wilson's conceptual scheme of the relationship between policy type 
and organizational activity (1973, 327-37). 
First, a policy with concentrated costs and concentrated benefits generates continuing 
organized conflict. Interest groups both on supporting and opposing sides are easily 
mobilized for lobbying. Legislators are highly cautious in the policy-making process. 
The policy result is likely to depend on the balance of power among the interest groups. 
This policy process is characterized by pluralistic interest group politics. A good 
example is the Minimum Wage Act of 1986. In the case, workers and employers were in 
a conflictual position and workers' demand finally prevailed owing to the political 
atmosphere of the liberalizing regime. 
Second, a policy involving distributed costs and concentrated benefits attracts the 
relatively strong support of beneficiary groups but little opposition. Legislators are likely 
to expeditiously respond to the supporting groups. Clientele politics unfolds. This is 
illustrated by the legislative process of the Telecommunications Enterprise Act made 
and revised in the 1980's. In this case, the benefiting firms were clientele groups. 
Third, a policy incurring concentrated costs and conferring distributed benefits 
galvanizes the opposition of the interest groups bearing the costs, but receiving no 
strong organized support. Such policy is rarely adopted. Unusually, policy 
entrepreneurs, taking full advantage of their personal skill and strategic institutional 
position, may manage to obtain consent for adopting the policy. This process may be 
called entrepreneurial politics. The Water Quality and Environmental Preservation Act 
of 1991 was of the case, where despite the strong objection of organized business the 
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environmental protection agency along with its allying legislators stood fIrm to have it 
enacted. 
Last, a policy spreading its costs and benefIts produces little political controversy. 
Interest group activity is likely to be dormant. Technical details and merits of the policy 
are much debated on, and the legislature decides upon it. Majoritarian politics takes 
place. As a typical case of it, lung and his associates offer the Medical Insurance Act, 
initially made in the early 1960's and revised several times up to the late 1980's. 
8. Effectiveness of Interest Group Lobbying 
Is lobbying effective in the Korean legislative arena? If it is, to what extent? Which 
one is more effective, reinforcing the positions of friends who are already supportive or 
changing foes' positions? Does the effectiveness of legislative lobbying vary from one 
group to another? What determines the effectiveness of interest group lobbying? One 
can ask a series of questions regarding the effectiveness of interest group lobbying. 
It is more difficult to empirically determine the impact of lobbying on legislative 
behavior in the Korean legislative politics than it is in the U. S. Congressional politics. 
Rollcalls have not been institutionalized in the Korean legislature at this writing. The 
amount of political contribution received by the individual legislator is never known. It 
is infeasible to try to find any causal link between political contributions and legislators' 
voting decisions. 
One reasonable way of fathoming the effect of lobbying is to compare the content of 
a bill approved by a committee or the legislature with the positions articulated by the 
relevant interest groups in the legislative process. In so doing, the researcher can assess 
whether or not a group has benefited from the output of legislative decision making. In 
fact, previous researchers have followed this line of strategy. Most of them are 
concerned with the consequences of interest articulation made by organized labor and 
business, the KFfU and the FKI, when major bills of their interests were deliberated in 
the legislature. Their studies suggest that organized labor may be favored in the short 
run, but that business interest prevails over the long run. This implies that there exists 
systemic imbalance between labor and business in the effectiveness of legislative 
lobbying (for example, Y R. Kim 1990,266-8; 273-9). But the existing case studies of 
legislative measures are, on the whole, too superficial. They lack a detailed inside 
analysis of legislative process, including legislator-interest group interactions, 
deliberative work in committees, and floor decision making. 
Authors of existing studies, especially of those grounded in the state corporatist 
perspective, argue that the effectiveness of a group's lobbying is determined primarily 
by its external factors, most significantly, the regime's inclusionary or exclusionary 
stance toward the group. In their view, the internal factors, such as organizational 
cohesion, financial resources, and leadership are secondary forces influencing the effect 
of lobbying (Chang 1985; H. Yoon and Y. R. Kim 1989,72-3). Yet this plausible 
argument on the relative importance of internal or external factors has not been tested in 
a rigorous manner. 
One study has shown that the level of political competition, a regime factor, impinges 
on the effectiveness of a group's legislative lobbying (Ko 1993). The researcher has 
examined the pressure exerted by the KFfU and the FKI on the legislature deliberating 
labor laws in both the authoritarian and democratic eras. The findings go as below. Only 
the views and interests of the FKI, the most powerful economic elites' group, was 
effectively mirrored in the revised laws during the authoritarian era when political 
competition was limited. But the mass-based KFfU has become able to increase the 
effectiveness of its lobbying in the politically competitive democratic era. 
Internal factors for effective lobbying should be given more attention than recognized 
by existing studies. Businessmen's shared social backgrounds and personal connections 
with legislators must be a key factor for the competitive advantage enjoyed by organized 
business in lobbying. Typical pre-legislative careers of the former and current Korean 
legislators are bureaucrats, generals, professors, lawyers, and businessmen. A small 
number of former labor union leaders have served as legislators (H. W Kim 1996). As 
mentioned earlier, big business is a vital source of political money. Undoubtedly, a 
group's internal factors, including all kinds of resources, will have a weighty bearing on 
its effective lobbying. Further research is expected to verify all of these statements. 
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Researchers have yet to inquire into the conditions under which interest groups lobby 
the legislature and get much of what they want. Wilson's conceptual framework 
mentioned earlier may provide some useful insight for this inquiry. According to the 
framework, the level of groups' intervention in policy process is likely to be highest in 
pluralistic interest group politics. But he suggests that the condition of clientele politics 
will render expeditious benefits to the relevant groups. 
Along this line of research, Cigler and Loomis have also offered a refined conceptual 
framework for analyzing the dynamic nature of interest group politics and legislative 
decision making. The scope of conflict and the number of interested parties help 
determine what type of politics or policy-making context shapes up and how much 
effectively interest groups will lobby in their favor. Interest groups are most active in 
"public confrontation politics" arising when the scope of conflict is broad and the 
number of people and interests affected by a policy is large. But the effect of an interest 
group's lobbying is most favorably gained in "niche politics" existing when the scope of 
conflict is narrow and the number of interested parties is small (Cigler and Loomis 
1991, 392-3). When compared with the prevailing holistic perspective of corporatism, 
this kind of analytic framework is more likely to capture the dynamics of legislative-
interest group relations and to produce concrete research results. It will be interesting to 
see whether Cigler and Loomis's framework is of utility for analyzing the interaction of 
legislators and interest groups in a different national setting. 
9. The Alliance of Policy Actors 
In the study of policy making in the U. S. Congress, the terminologies such as "policy 
subsystems," "subgovemments" or "iron triangles" refer to the fairly stable alliances of 
Congressional committees, administrative agencies, and interest groups, working 
closely through mutual accommodation of one another's interests. Also, there are on-
going discussions on somewhat fluid "policy communities or issue networks" (Hamm 
1985,574-6; Smith 1995, 113-6). 
The notion of policy subsystem or community may sound inappropriate to the 
researchers on the decision making in the Korean National Assembly. The legislature 
does not playa pivotal role in the making of public policies. And, the pattern of decision 
making in the legislature is neither fragmented nor decentralized. Policy subsystems or 
communities are not likely to emerge or prosper. Furthermore, legislative committees do 
not function as the center stage where legislators, bureaucrats, and interest groups work 
on well-defined policies. In the Fenno's parlance, the committees are of a "permeable" 
type (1973, 137-8; 278-9). Committee leadership is nominal, and partisan dominance is 
strong. Committees are not autonomous in relation to its parental body. A sense of 
collective identity is fragile and transitory (c. W Park 1998b). 
Still, there are signs that some kind of decision structure made up of mutually 
accommodating legislators, bureaucrats, and interest groups may already exist in its 
incipient form or be now rapidly emerging. As mentioned earlier, legislators in 
committees and their counterpart bureaucrats cooperate in the decision making over 
budgetary matters. Some committees are remarkably more clientele-oriented than other 
committees. In making some type of policies, clientele politics is observed. A sincere 
research effort should be focused on the legislative committee-centered policy alliance, 
though it may have a premature form. 
When the analysis is shifted from the level of legislative institution to the macro 
systemic level, there is much talk and some scholarly investigation about the politics-
business collusion or the triumvirate of the ruling party's top leaders, high-level 
bureaucrats, and big business in the Korean policy process. This is not a legislature-
centered but an executive-centered alliance of policy actors. The chief executives, 
having set economic development as the overriding national objective, induced big 
business to work closely with key bureaucrats in the formulation and implementation of 
economic policies. Leading politicians of the ruling party joined the alliance for their 
role of enacting and legitimating executive policies in the legislature. This macro-level 
alliance structure has been made pretty much durable in terms of its constituent people 
and groups due to the long lack of power transfer to the opposition party.5) Furthermore, 
5) The victory of Kim Dae lung in the presidential election of 1997 is recorded as the first case of 
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the alliance structure has been based on several reinforcing mechanisms, such as the 
recruitment of former economic bureaucrats into executive positions of big business, 
political donations from big business to politicians, and the intermarriages between the 
offspring of politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen (H. Ahn, 1971, 105-6; U5-l20; 
Chang 1985; Shin and Chin 1989). 
Pejoratively speaking, the Korean version of triumvirate is a bribery network as well 
as a policy alliance. The reciprocal linkage between big business and those in power, 
including political and bureaucratic elites, has cultivated corruption. At the apex of 
power, former Presidents Roh Tae Woo and Chun Doo Hwan maintained slush funds 
collected from business conglomerates in return for special favors, such as low-interest 
bank loans, government licenses for engaging in huge development projects and other 
lucrative business, tax incentives, and the like. The secret funds were used to support the 
ruling party and politicians, and other followers. In President Roh's case, it has been 
revealed that he provided financial support to not only the ruling party's candidate but 
also the candidate of the main opposition party in the 1992 presidential election. At the 
next level, connected to its upper level, there have existed dark relations between 
politicians or bureaucrats and business tycoons. One financial scandal after another has 
vindicated the existence of these corrupt links (B. Park 1995, 172-80). Fortunately, 
along with the regime's democratization, the transparency of policy process is 
tremendously increasing. It remains to be seen that the much-awaited opposition's 
victory in the 1997 presidential election would provide the Korean polity with a 
significant momentum for eradicating such corrupt practices. 
V. Conclusion 
From a critical viewpoint, the extant literature on the relationship between legislators 
power transfer to the opposition party through election. However, it should be noted that he could 
win the presidency owing much to his strategy of forming a coalition with a bloc of former ruling 
politicians. 
and bureaucrats or interest groups in Korea is meager, shallow and outdated. The 
relevant scholarly research is very limited in quantity. It has produced a coherent body 
of knowledge on only selected aspects of legislative-administrative bureaucratic and 
legislative-interest group interactions. As for the national legislature's oversight and 
control of the bureaucracy, annual inspection alone has attracted attentive researchers. 
Their studies show the ways the legislature handles administrative agencies and what 
practical problems arise in legislative inspection. Concerning interest group politics, we 
have some knowledge about the workings of business and labor organizations, their 
lobbying techniques, and their relationship with the government. But the focus of 
existing research is mainly set on the executive branch. So we are left with little 
systematic knowledge on legislative-interest group interactions in policy process. What 
is more, we lack in freshly added knowledge on the pattern of interest group politics 
emerging in the current democratic era. 
Existing studies, especially those on legislative inspection, are largely descriptive with 
a strong normative bent. The researchers describe how political actors interact with one 
another in policy process. But they come short of asking explicitly why some pattern of 
interaction exists the way it does. Driven by their normative zeal for giving remedy to 
current undesirable symptoms, they do make little effort to find the pathological causes 
and hastily move to prescribe some kind of therapy. Without adequate explanation, the 
descriptive analysis only is not likely to generate a workable prescription. 
A full-blown empirical analysis rarely exists. Hypotheses are not explicitly put 
forward and rigorously tested against the data. In the existing qualitative studies, 
typologies or classification schemes are often employed for description. But most of 
those studies lack an overarching conceptual framework which helps a researcher 
organize his or her work as a coherent whole. In the previous quantitative studies, data 
analysis does not basically surpass simple tallies of cases. Sophisticated statistical 
analysis is almost non-existent. 
Theoretical perspectives, which have been adopted in existing studies for guiding the 
investigators to organize and tackle with research questions, show little variety and 
innovation. Researchers were led by a pluralist perspective at the earlier stage of 
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studying interest groups. But this perspective was never further refined, and became 
extinct in the subsequent research. The state corporatist perspective claimed its 
relevance to the interest group politics of the authoritarian era and became hegemonic 
among the researchers. The corporatist perspective focused mostly on interest 
articulation and representation outside the framework of legislative institution, and was 
concerned with the state-class relations on a macro level. This perspective is inherently 
irrelevant to the investigation of legislator-interest group interactions in legislative 
decision making. Recently, political democratization has made researchers recognize the 
validity of a pluralist perspective. Still, researchers are only familiar with the outmoded 
notion of pressure politics. For instance, the notion of information sharing between 
legislators and interest groups is not known to the community of researchers on Korean 
interest group politics. The existing concepts, propositions, and strategies for research 
remain much old and stale. 
Mezey (1993, 335) has aptly stated that the individual-level analysis is not central to 
the studies on legislative politics outside the United States Congress. Congressional 
scholars used to explain legislative behavior and institutional performance in terms of 
the individual legislator'S goals and objectives. In this sense, for students of the United 
States Congress, the individual legislator is the primary unit of analysis. In contrast, in 
the existing research on the interactions between Korean legislators and bureaucrats or 
interest groups, the primary unit of analysis is the aggregate entity, such as the 
committee, the legislature, the agency, or the bureaucracy. Therefore, the explanation of 
institutional performance is not firmly founded on the micro-level attributes or 
phenomena. 
A pile of research questions lie ahead. We need to investigate the interaction of 
legislators and bureaucrats on other occasions than annual inspection. The two groups of 
officials encounter each other when legislative investigation and interpellation are held. 
These two groups also face each other over budgetary matters before and after the 
budget proposal is introduced to the legislature. More research should be done on these 
interactions between legislators and bureaucrats. A set of hypotheses are to be generated 
and tested regarding the level of oversight activity and its determinants for both the 
individual legislator and the legislative institution. Again, the impact of oversight on 
bureaucratic responsiveness deserves a rigorous examination. 
As a research topic, legislative-interest group relations need to be given more 
recognition than previously. It is desirable to examine closely the varying degrees of 
individual legislators' bond with interest groups and the determinants as well. Future 
research had better consider a variety of organized interests beyond business or labor 
groups, including already activated public interest groups. Researchers need to take into 
account relatively new lobbying techniques, such as grassroots lobbying or coalition 
lobbying, in the dynamics of legislative-interest group interactions. We need to inquire 
into the conditions under which interest groups show a high level of activity and have a 
strong influence in the legislative arena. The question of committee-centered policy 
subsystems or networks also challenges legislative scholars for future empirical 
research. 
Over the decade since the late 1980s, the Korean National Assembly has undergone 
significant changes both internally and externally. The regime made a dramatic 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy. It now goes through the process of 
consolidation. In the 1988, 1992, and 1994 general elections for the National Assembly, 
the turnover rate measured by the percentage of first-term members continued to be 
40% or more. The president's party fell into the position of legislative minority twice, 
which had never happened in the authoritarian era. The political party system is all the 
more fluid because of frequent inter-party realignments in both elections and the 
legislature. Outcries for internal democracy within a party are often heard. Legislative 
reform continues to be carried out for building a stronger and more effective legislature. 
On the other hand, among legislative scholars, a consensus still remains intact on the 
image of the national legislature as a weak policy actor overshadowed by the executive. 
Also, the legislature is seen by most scholars as passive and lukewarm in the making of 
policies aimed at realizing economic justice, establishing a fair economic order, 
promoting human rights measures, and bringing about a change in the existing ruling 
structure. One cannot remove the possibility that ever-changing legislative politics may 
make the prevailing image and view outdated in the near future. Unless we want our 
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knowledge to lag behind the changing realities of legislative politics, we are urged to 
gear up for a series of systematic research, 
Students of Korean legislative politics are advised to refine their strategies for data 
collection and analysis, Obtaining data from interviews with legislators, bureaucrats, and 
interest group leaders is highly recommendable for studying attitudes and interaction 
patterns. Some researchers have undertaken surveys of legislators based on the 
structured interview schedule. On the other hand, very few researchers so far 
interviewed bureaucrats or interest group leaders in this manner. Aberbach, Putnam, and 
Rockman's study (1981) is probably the best model for the structured elite interview. 
For example, by asking legislators and bureaucrats whom they meet and how often, they 
found varying contact patterns in several western democracies and explored why the 
patterns differ (233-7). Given the rudimentary knowledge on legislative decision making 
in Korea, the unstructured but in-depth personal interview seems more attractive for the 
same research purpose. This type of interview is made as part of participant observation, 
what Fenno calls "soaking and poking" approach (1978, xiv). This method will surely 
help researchers get first-hand experiences in legislative decision making, and provide a 
detailed analysis of it. To add another research strategy, intensive case studies of 
legislation are much wanted. Whether the case studies are qualitatively or quantitatively 
pursued, they will suggest useful insights and testable propositions for further research. 
Thus, the accumulation of case studies on aborted or successfully passed bills are 
warranted. 
Most importantly, the prospective research should be driven by adequate theories. In 
studying legislative-administrative bureaucratic relations, we need theories which 
incorporate both conflictual and collaborative aspects of interaction between two groups 
of officials, and provide useful insights and testable hypotheses about their interactions. 
We want theories that help explain the workings of political institutions with solid 
micro-level underpinnings. These theories, given their tested causal propositions, will 
enable us to search for remedies to the problems encountered at the individual and 
institutional levels. 
Rational choice theories, hardly applied thus far in the studies of Korean legislative 
politics, are definitely an alternative for future research. More specifically, Niskanen's 
(1972) or McCubbins, Noll and Weingast's (1987; 1989) theory of political institutions 
can be a good candidate to be applied in the study of Korean legislative-administrative 
bureaucratic relations. Especially, the latter's conceptualization of controlling agencies 
as a principal-agent problem is insightful. This theory furnishes us with a fresh 
perspective on the nature of the legislature's relationship with administrative agencies, 
and on the problems of bureaucratic noncompliance. According to this theory, means of 
solving the problems are given new meaning and significance. Legislative inspection, 
investigation, and interpellation, together with budget review, constitute the police-patrol 
monitoring mechanism. Legislators involve in the "fire-alarm" monitoring of the 
bureaucracy while interceding with the bureaucracy for performing constituency 
service. Administrative procedures serve as ex ante means of controlling the 
bureaucracy. Bringing the president as another principal into perspective can make the 
analysis more realistic and valid than otherwise. 
Likewise, for legislative-interest group relations, we need a fresh theoretical 
perspective. It seems that Wright has come to the point in this regard (1996). Lobbying 
used to be considered as exercising pressure in policy process. He argues that interest 
groups use their information strategically and share it with legislators in the lobbying 
process. This information perspective suggests researchers to delve into the kinds of 
information provided by interest groups, their proactive or counteractive usage of it, and 
legislators' response patterns (1-8; 75-113). As long as pluralistic competition is taking 
place among interest groups surrounding legislative decision making, the information 
perspective is universally valid beyond the arena of the United States Congress. 
As repeatedly emphasized in this essay, Korean legislative politics is in the process of 
transition. Although the inertia of old political practices may be still strong, there also 
exist increasingly significant undercurrents militating against it. The future direction is 
toward a stronger legislature in a more competitive regime. The current research 
practices, however, are not likely to measure up to these possible changes. The existing 
research lacks the diversity in theoretical perspectives and investigation strategies. The 
tradition of descriptive-therapeutic studies with rudimentary empirical evidence is deep 
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rooted. There exist only some systematically executed behavioral-empirical studies. In 
addition, the studies drawing on formal deductive theories are a rare breed. It is 
imperative that old research practices should be overhauled with the introduction of 
alternative theoretical perspectives and research strategies. The research needs 
reorientation and innovation. At this juncture, the field of Korean legislative studies 
probably stands in need of a Fenno who serves as a bridge connecting detailed 
descriptive studies to those based on deductive theoretical perspectives. 
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